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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the quantitative importance of collective bargaining 
agreements for the observed fluctuations in Bulgarian labor markets. Following 
Maffezzoli (Rev Econ Dyn 4:860–892, 2001), we introduce a monopoly union into 
a real-business-cycle model with government sector. We calibrate the model to Bul-
garian data for the period following the introduction of the currency board arrange-
ment (1999–2018), and compare and contrast it to a model without unions. We find 
that the sequential bargaining procedure between the monopoly union and the stand-
in firm produces an important internal propagation mechanism within the theoretical 
setup, which allows the monopoly model to fit data better than the alternative frame-
work with perfectly-competitive labor markets.
Keywords Business cycles · General equilibrium · Labor unions · Indivisible labor · 
Involuntary unemployment
JEL Classification E32 · E24 · J23 · J51
1  Introduction and motivation
The standard real-business-cycle (RBC) model, featuring a perfectly-competitive 
labor market, e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983), was 
shown to be unable to capture the dynamics in the labor markets in the US. For 
Bulgaria, Vasilev (2009) documented a similar failure for the model to match the 
observed wage- and employment fluctuations. As a general rule, most of those ear-
lier studies in the literature have tried to explained the mismatch with a modeling 
choice based on perfect information and market-clearing, and thus involuntary 
unemployment is absent from the framework. Bulgaria, however, along with many 
other Eastern European countries, registers a significant amount of involuntary 
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unemployment, which was due to the process of structural transformation in the 
economy. In other words, being out of job in such an environment is clearly not an 
optimal choice, as it represents a waste of non-storable labor resources.
Modeling correctly unemployment as an inefficient outcome requires research-
ers to depart from the Walrasian (market-clearing) view of labor markets. In other 
words, involuntary unemployment can only appear in a model setup where certain 
labor market imperfections that are present in the economy are also modeled. One 
typical example of labor market frictions is the prevalence of collective bargaining 
arrangements between labor unions and firms in the economy. Figure 1 below docu-
ments their quantitative importance in Bulgaria.
The results above suggest that those arrangements need to be taken seriously 
when modeling labor markets in Bulgaria. In particular, despite the fall in the over-
all unionization rate, measured by “union density”, over the period covered, and 
the decentralization of collective bargaining to individual firm’s level, such collec-
tive agreements are still important on the aggregate level—after all, over a third of 
employed workers in Bulgaria are covered by some form of collective agreement. 
Moreover, given that such agreements usually take place in the largest firms (and in 
the public sector), the remaining firms generally follow closely those agreements in 
the non-unionized sectors as well. For example, Paskaleva (2016) demonstrates that 
the fact that real wages in Bulgaria are downward rigid is exactly due to the collec-
tive agreements in place, which prohibit cuts in base wages, and only allow for tem-
porary wage freezes.1 In addition, such legal restrictions in place mean that adjust-
ing labor costs needs to happen mostly through employment reductions.2 Therefore, 
real rigidities in the labor market along those lines could potentially generate a qual-
itatively important propagation mechanism in the model, which, in addition to mak-
ing the setup more realistic, can help the artificial economy match observed business 
cycle fluctuations better, especially along the labor market dimension.
Fig. 1  Union density and coverage rates in Bulgaria. Source: European Trade Union Institute (2018)
1 Lozev et  al. (2011) also document downward real wage rigidity in Bulgaria. He finds it to be lower 
than the rigidity in the other EU member states.
2 Therefore, the very presence of collective bargaining may also generate involuntary unemployment.
145
1 3
Eurasian Economic Review (2020) 10:143–161 
We take the empirical findings presented in Fig. 1 above as an empirical regu-
larity, which in turn motivates our modeling approach. In this paper, we take the 
presence of unions in the setup as an important ingredient in the theoretical frame-
work. We then adapt the standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
model by augmenting it with a plausible mechanism of collective wage bargain-
ing procedure. This modeling approach deviates from spot wage contracting, and 
instead emphasize institutional labor arrangement. Furthermore, the alternative 
mechanism of wage contracting considered here is also based on non-Walrasian set-
tings, which are promising area of research, as pointed above, and in Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989).
We follow Maffezzoli (2001), and introduce monopoly labor unions in the gen-
eral-equilibrium setup, in order to study their quantitative implications for business 
cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria.3 In contrast to Vasilev (2015c), who introduces a 
union in the government sector only, here the union is to be interpreted as a private-
sector union, as we do not model public employment explicitly.4 Another novelty 
relative to the setup in Maffezzoli (2001) is that we make the reservation wage in 
the monopoly-union objective function conditional on the total factor productivity, 
which, aside from making the model more realistic, further helps to improve the 
model’s performance vis-a-vis data. In addition, we also discuss the business cycle 
properties of real wages and employment, their auto-correlations, and the dynamic 
correlation between employment and the wage rate, which is missing from Maffez-
zoli (2001).
We then proceed to calibrate the model to Bulgarian data after the introduction 
of the currency board arrangement, which was a period of aggregate stability, and 
study the impulse responses of aggregate variables in the face of exogenous tech-
nological shocks. We compare and contrast the monopoly-union model against a 
framework without unions, and more specifically to the Rogerson and Wright (1988) 
setup with indivisible labor and inseparable utility in consumption and leisure. The 
latter was chosen, as it was shown in King and Rebelo (2000) to dominate the stand-
ard model with divisible hours, while retaining the perfectly-competitive labor mar-
kets assumption. Also, the indivisible labor model is more realistic, when compared 
to the setup with divisible labor, Vasilev (2009), as in Bulgaria most of the people 
work full-time, so the variability in hours happens mostly along the extensive mar-
gin, i.e., employment, and not that much along the intensive margin, or hours per 
worker.
3 Zanetti (2007) uses a similar mechanism to Maffezzoli (2001) but in a New–Keynesian framework. 
Zanetti (2007) and Faccini et al. (2013) are also examples of studies that investigate the effect of wage 
rigidities on business cycle fluctuations. However, his focus is also slightly different from ours. For alter-
native ways of modeling the labor market the reader is referred to Vasilev (2016, 2017a, b, c). Those 
setups are not totally incompatible with the union model presented here, but could be considered as a 
complementary to the union bargaining mechanism.
4 Indeed, the two big unions in Bulgaria—KNSB and Podkrepa—cover both private- and public-sector 
employees. Extending the model along with this dimension will not significantly change the results in the 
paper.
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Overall, the calibrated model with collective bargaining mechanism between the 
union and the firm provides a tractable general-equilibrium setup, which performs 
well vis-a-vis data when it comes to relative volatilities of time series, auto- and cross-
correlation functions, and in addition dominates both the market-clearing labor mar-
ket specification with indivisible labor as in Rogerson and Wright (1988). More spe-
cifically, the presence of the monopoly union causes labor productivity in the model to 
lead employment over the business cycle, which is what we observe in the data as well. 
The very low dynamic correlation between wages and employment in Bulgaria is well-
approximated in the model, mostly due to the fact that the wage rate is generated as an 
outcome of a sequential bargaining procedure. The model with unions also generates 
persistence in output and both employment and unemployment, and is able to respond 
to the criticism in Nelson and Plosser (1982), Cogley and Nason (1995), Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1996), and Hall (1999) who all argue that RBC models generally do 
not have a strong internal propagation mechanism (besides the strong persistence in the 
TFP process, that is).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes the model setup and 
characterizes the decentralized competitive equilibrium system, Sect. 3 discusses the 
calibration procedure, and Sect. 4 presents the steady-state model solution. Section 5 
proceeds with the out-of-steady-state dynamics of all model variables, and compares 
the simulated second moments of theoretical variables against their empirical counter-
parts. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2  Model description
There is a continuum of homogeneous households, which derive utility out of con-
sumption and leisure. The time available to households can be either spent in produc-
tive use or as leisure. The government taxes consumption spending, and levies a com-
mon proportional tax on all income, in order to finance non-productive purchases of 
government consumption goods, and government transfers. On the production side, 
there is a representative firm, which hires labor and capital to produce a homogene-
ous final good, which could be used for consumption, investment, or government pur-
chases. The wage rate in the economy is determined by a utility-maximizing union, as 
in Maffezzoli (2001), subject to the firm’s conditional labor demand.
2.1  Households
Each household i, i ∈ [0, 1] , maximizes the following utility function, which, as in 
Rogerson and Wright (1988), is non-separable in consumption and leisure:
where E0 is the expectation operation conditional on information available as of 
t = 0 , 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is the discount factor, ci
t
 is individual household consumption in 
(1)max
{cit ,h
i
t}
∞
t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
훽 t
[ci
t
(1 − hi
t
)휓 ]1−휇
1 − 휇
,
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period t, and hi
t
 are total hours worked. Parameter 𝜓 > 0 reflects the relative weight 
attached to the dis-utility of work, and 𝜇 > 1 captures the curvature of the utility 
function.
Each household i faces a non-convex labor supply decision, hi
t
∈ {0;h̄},∀t , with 
h̄ < 1 . Hours supplied to the representative firm are rewarded at the hourly wage rate 
of wt , so pre-tax labor income equals wtht . In addition, each household starts with a 
positive endowment of physical capital, ki
0
 , in period 0, which is then rented to the 
firm at the rental rate rt , so before-tax capital income equals rtkit . Households may 
also decide to invest in capital to augment the capital stock, which evolves according 
to the following law of motion:
where 0 < 𝛿 < 1 is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
In addition to the rental income received, the household owns the firm, and thus 
has a legal claim to an equal share of the firm’s profit, Πt = 휋t . The budget con-
straint faced by an individual household is then
where 휏c is the tax rate on final consumption, 휏y is the proportional rate on labor and 
capital income, and gt
t
 are per household government transfers.
In equilibrium, following the argument in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), 
only a proportion nt, 0 < nt < 1 of all households will be employed in each period,5 
which will denote the employment rate; note that the employment rate in the model 
is allowed to be time-varying. In addition, as in Rogerson and Wright (1988) and 
King and Rebelo (2000), we no longer have complete insurance, which will equalize 
consumption across employment states. In this model
where ce
t
 and cu
t
 denote consumption levels of a worker and a non-worker, respec-
tively, and where we have suppressed the i notation. Note that for 0 < h̄ < 1 , 𝜇 > 1 
and 𝜓 > 0 , (1 − h̄)
𝜓
𝜇
−𝜓
> 1 . In other words, an employed individual would receive 
a higher consumption that that of an unemployed individual, ce
t
> cu
t
 . As argued in 
Rogerson and Wright (1988), it can be also shown that the wage rate of an employed 
individual is higher than the marginal product of labor, hence the model will gener-
ate involuntary unemployment even in the absence of any other frictions in the labor 
market.
After aggregation over individual preferences, the aggregate household now fea-
tures different preferences. It maximizes the following aggregate utility function
(2)kit+1 = iit + (1 − 훿)kit,
(3)(1 + 휏c)cit + kit+1 − (1 − 훿)kit = (1 − 휏y)[wthit + rtkit + 휋t] + gtt,
(4)ce
t
= cu
t
(1 − h̄)
𝜓
𝜇
−𝜓
,
(5)max
{ct ,nt}
∞
t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
훽 t
[ct휙(nt)]
1−휇
1 − 휇
,
5 Those who are ex-post employed will be chosen at random by the employer, as all workers are identical 
from the perspective of the firm).
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where we have suppressed the u superscript for consumption, and
As in Maffezzoli (2001), the function above will be interpreted as the dis-
utility of employment for the aggregate household. The elasticity of 휙(.) with 
respect to employment is 휉휙 = 휙�(n)n∕휙(n).
Next, since the aggregate household has effectively pooled together all capital 
resources, hence ki
0
= k0,∀i . This result amends the aggregate budget constraint 
as follows
As in Maffezzoli (2001), we will refer to this setup as the “Rogerson–Wright 
economy”, or “RW”, after Rogerson and Wright (1988). The Lagrangean of the 
aggregate household’s problem is then
The first-order optimality conditions (FOCs) and the transversality condition are as 
follows:
where 휆t is the Lagrangean multiplier attached to the aggregate household’s period-t 
budget constraint. The interpretation of the optimality conditions is standard in the 
literature. In the first, the household equates the marginal utility of consumption, 
to the VAT-adjusted shadow price of wealth. The second equation determines the 
optimal employment, where the household balances the marginal cost to the mar-
ginal benefit from working. The remaining equations from the original FOCs are 
standard: for example, the Euler equation for capital stock describes how capital 
is allocated across any adjacent periods in order to maximize household’s utility. 
The transversality conditions (TVCs) for physical capital is a boundary condition 
imposed to rule out explosive solutions in the model.
(6)𝜙(nt) = [nt(1 − h̄)
𝜓
𝜇
(1−𝜇)
+ (1 − nt)]
1
1−𝜇
(7)(1 + 𝜏c)ct + kt+1 − (1 − 𝛿)kt = (1 − 𝜏y)[wtnth̄ + rtkt + 𝜋t] + gtt.
(8)
L =E
0
∞∑
t=0
𝛽 t
{
[ct𝜙(nt)]
1−𝜇
1 − 𝜇
− 𝜆t
[
(1 + 𝜏c)ct + kt+1 − (1 − 𝛿)kt
− (1 − 𝜏y)[wtnth̄ + rtkt + 𝜋t] − g
t
t
]}
.
(9)ct ∶ c−휇t [휙(nt)]1−휇 = (1 + 휏c)휆t
(10)nt ∶ c1−𝜇t [𝜙(nt)]−𝜇 = 𝜆t(1 − 𝜏y)wth̄,
(11)kt+1 ∶ 휆t = 훽Et휆t+1[1 − 훿 + (1 − 휏y)rt+1]
(12)TVCk ∶ lim
t→∞
훽 t휆tkt+1 = 0,
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2.2  Firm’s problem
There is a representative firm in the economy, which produces a homogeneous final 
product. The price of output is normalized to unity. The production technology is 
Cobb–Douglas and uses both physical capital, kt , and labor hours, nth̄ , to maximize 
static profit
where At denotes the level of technology in period t, 0 < 𝛼, 1 − 𝛼 < 1 denote the 
capital and labor share, respectively.
Since the firm rents the capital from households, the problem of the firm is a 
sequence of static profit maximizing problems. In equilibrium, there are no profits, 
and each input is priced according to its marginal product, i.e.:
In equilibrium, given that the inputs of production are paid their marginal prod-
ucts, 휋t = 0 , ∀t.
2.3  The monopoly union
In an alternative setup, which we refer to as “the monopoly-union model”, or “MU”, 
the workers no longer choose their individual labor supply. In other words, the opti-
mality condition for labor supply, Eq. (10), will be no longer a part of the equi-
librium system. Instead, the condition determining optimal employment will be 
obtained from the union optimization problem described below. In other words, in 
the MU setup workers have decided that by organizing into a labor union, they can 
bargain more successfully as a group, and in turn, can extract some of the producer 
surplus. Here, we take the presence of unions as an empirical regularity, and do not 
focus on the process of union formation itself. For example, Westermark (1999) 
shows that substitutable workers have an incentive to organize into unions, while 
complementary workers do not. In our model, the assumption of homogeneous 
households is thus equivalent to having a unit mass of perfectly substitutable work-
ers. Alternatively, with everyone in the union, the organization is able to achieve 
complete diversification, and thus its preferences are risk-neutral.
The unions can be now aggregated into a representative union bargaining with 
the representative firm: the union and the firm will then jointly determine the wage 
rate and the aggregate unemployment rate. In order to prevent union members who 
turn out to be unemployed ex post from leaving the union, the union has to provide 
a fair insurance against unemployment incidence. This is the approach followed in 
Maffezzoli (2001) and Benassy (1997), which we adopt in this paper, and which 
(13)Πt = Atk𝛼t (nth̄)1−𝛼 − rtkt − wtht,
(14)kt ∶ 훼
yt
kt
= rt,
(15)nth̄ ∶ (1 − 𝛼)
yt
ht
= wt.
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allows us to abstract away from heterogeneity driven by the employment status. 
As a result, the marginal utility of consumption is equalized across employed and 
unemployed individuals, and the aggregation into a single aggregate household is 
possible.
The union is now a single seller of labor services, and behaves as a monopolist in 
the that market. As in Oswald (1982) and Palokangas (2000), the union’s objective 
is to maximize the members’ expected wage bill, or:
s.t. the firm’s conditional labor demand
where nt is the employment rate, and w̄t denotes the unions’ reservation wage. 
The reservation wage can be viewed as the disutility of employment perceived by 
the unions, and inclusive of any type of unemployment benefits. As in Maffezzoli 
(2001), the sequence of reservation wages will be taken as being exogenous {w̄t}∞t=0 . 
The novelty in this paper is that in contrast to Maffezzoli (2001), in this setup the 
reservation wages is responding to the state of the economy, or equivalently, the 
level of total factor productivity. We believe this technical assumption to be a better 
description of reality, and in addition helps the model match data along the labor 
market dimension.6
Note that the union takes as given the conditional labor demand of the repre-
sentative firm, as well as the reservation wage. In other words, once the wage rate 
is determined, firms choose the employment rate along the labor demand curve. 
This assumption is standard in this class of “monopoly union” setups, e.g. Dunlop 
(1944), Manning (1987) and Oswald (1982). Note that although a union is large at 
the firm or sector level, it is small at the aggregate level, and thus takes unions take 
rt as given.
The union and the firm then solve a sequence of independent games, due to the 
fact that (1) the monopoly union takes the rental rate of capital as given; (2) pre-
commitment is ruled out, and (3) the services provided by the capital and labor 
inputs are purchased in each period t. Therefore, in the absence of credible pre-com-
mitment, the union will not internalize the dynamic effect of today’s wage on future 
investment, or the process of capital accumulation. In other words, investment in 
capital in equilibrium will be inefficiently low, and the wage rate is above its mar-
ginal product.
As in Maffezzoli (2001), and Anderson and Devereux (1988), we solve for the 
Markov equilibria, and more specifically, the focus is on Markov strategies depend-
ing only on current exogenous and endogenous state (predetermined) variables. The 
wage rate and the demand for capital will be jointly determined to form the Nash 
equilibrium of the game: the first two from the firm problem, while the employment 
will be determined from the union’s maximization problem.
(16)ntwt + (1 − nt)w̄t,
(17)wt = (1 − 𝛼)
yt
nth̄
,
6 Note that the union also takes {k
t
}∞
t=0
 as given.
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Substituting the expression for the wage from the firm’s optimality condition, the 
union’s objective function can be rewritten as
Maximizing then with respect to nt results in
or the employment rate chosen by the monopoly union is proportional to output and 
the reservation wage, where the latter follows the path of total factor productivity. As 
in the monopoly in the product market, here marginal revenue is also less than the 
price (wage), so the employment rate chosen by the monopoly union and the firm is 
lower than the socially efficient level, hence there is involuntary unemployment. The 
corresponding union wage rate is then obtained from the firm’s conditional labor 
demand function. Note that this differs from wage rigidity schemes used in other 
papers. In addition, the aggregate wage function is positively-sloped, but its slope 
bears no relationship to the elasticity of the individual labor supply. The search-
theoretic framework discussed in Hall and Liebman (1998), and Vasilev (2016) for 
the case of Bulgaria, features the same property—an elastic aggregate wage-setting 
function, which is compatible with inelastic labor supply at the individual household 
level.7 Therefore, the approach in this paper is also compatible with a search-theo-
retic model of the labor market.8
2.4  Government
In the model setup, the government is levying taxes on labor and capital income, as 
well as on consumption spending, in order to finance its spending on non-productive 
government purchases, and public transfers. The government budget constraint is as 
follows:
Income tax rate, consumption tax rate and government consumption-to-output 
ratio would be chosen to match the average share in data, while government trans-
fers would be determined residually in each period so that the government budget is 
always balanced.
2.5  Dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE)
For a given process followed by technology {At}∞t=0 , tax rates {휏c, 휏y} , the fixed 
length of the work week h̄ , and initial capital stock {k0} , the decentralized dynamic 
(18)ntAtk𝛼t (nth̄)1−𝛼 + (1 − nt)w̄t.
(19)nt = (1 − 𝛼)2
yt
w̄th̄
,
(20)gct + gtt = 𝜏cct + 𝜏y[wth̄nt + rtkt]
7 The same property was documented for the RW economy.
8 The wage process, resulting from Nash bargaining in a search-theoretic model, is not a good descriptor 
of the observed wage dynamics in Bulgaria, though.
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competitive equilibrium is a list of sequences {ct, it, kt, nt}∞t=0 for the household, 
a sequence of government purchases and transfers {gc
t
, gt
t
}∞
t=0
 , and input prices 
{wt, rt}
∞
t=0
 such that (1) the household maximizes its utility function subject to its 
budget constraint; (2) the representative firm maximizes profit; (3) in the union 
model, the union maximizes its objective function subject to the conditional demand 
for labor; (4) government budget is balanced in each period; (5) all markets clear.
3  Data and model calibration
To characterize business cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria, we will focus on the period 
following the introduction of the currency board (1999–2018). Quarterly data on 
output, consumption and investment was collected from Bulgarian National Bank 
(2019), while the real interest rate is taken from Bulgarian National Bank Statis-
tical Database (2019). The calibration strategy described in this section follows a 
long-established tradition in modern macroeconomics: first, as in Vasilev (2016), 
the discount factor, 훽 = 0.982 , is set to match the steady-state capital-to-output ratio 
in Bulgaria, k∕y = 13.964 , in the steady-state Euler equation. The capital share, 
훼 = 0.429 , was estimated as in Vasilev (2017d). Next, the average income tax rate 
was set to 휏y = 0.1 . This is the average effective tax rate on income between 1999 
and 2007, when Bulgaria used progressive income taxation, and equal to the pro-
portional income tax rate introduced as of 2008. Similarly, the average tax rate on 
consumption is set to its value over the period, 휏c = 0.2.
The value of the curvature parameter of the utility function is set to 휇 = 2 , which 
is a standard value in the literature. The relative weight attached to the utility out 
of leisure in the household’s utility function, 휓 = 2 , is calibrated to match that in 
steady-state consumers would supply one-third of their time endowment to work-
ing. This is in line with the estimates for Bulgaria (Vasilev 2017a) as well over the 
period studied. This calibration produces a value of the elasticity of the disutility of 
unemployment, 휉휙 = 0.757 . Employment rate, n = 0.533 , was also set to its average 
value over the period studied.
Table 1  Model parameters
Parameters Value Description Method
훽 0.982 Discount factor Calibrated
훼 0.429 Capital share, production function Data average
휇 2.000 Curvature parameter, utility function Set
휓 2.000 Relative weight attached to leisure Calibrated
훿 0.013 Depreciation rate on physical capital Data average
n 0.533 Employment rate Data average
휏y 0.100 Average tax rate on income Data average
휏c 0.200 VAT/consumption tax rate Data average
휌a 0.701 AR(1) persistence coefficient, TFP process Estimated
휎a 0.044 St. error, TFP process Estimated
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Next, the average depreciation rate of physical capital in Bulgaria, 훿 = 0.013 , was 
taken from Vasilev (2016). It was estimated as the average quarterly depreciation rate 
over the period 1999–2014. Finally, the TFP process is estimated from the detrended 
series by running an AR(1) regression and saving the residuals. Table 1 below summa-
rizes the values of all model parameters used in the paper.
4  Steady‑state
Once the values of model parameters were obtained, the steady-state equilibrium sys-
tem solved, the “big ratios” can be compared to their averages in Bulgarian data. Both 
models produce the same steady-state; the results are reported in Table 2 below. The 
steady-state level of output was normalized to unity (hence the level of technology 
A differs from one, which is usually the normalization done in other studies), which 
greatly simplified the computations. Next, the models match government purchases 
ratios by construction; the consumption-to-output and investment ratio is also relatively 
closely approximated, despite the closed-economy assumption and the absence of for-
eign trade sector. The shares of income are also identical to those in data, which is an 
artefact of the assumptions imposed on functional form of the aggregate production 
function. The after-tax return, where r̄ = (1 − 𝜏y)r − 𝛿 is also relatively well-captured 
by the model. Lastly, given the absence of debt, and the fact that public transfers were 
chosen residually to balance the government budget constraint, the result along this 
dimension is understandably not so close to the average ratio in data.
5  Out of steady‑state model dynamics
Since both models do not have an analytical solution for the equilibrium behavior 
of variables outside their steady-state values, we need to solve the models numeri-
cally. This is done by log-linearizing the original equilibrium (non-linear) system of 
Table 2  Data averages and long-run solution
Variable Description Data Model 
(RW & 
MU)
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000
c / y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.648 0.674
i / y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175
k / y Capital-to-output ratio 13.96 13.96
gc∕y Government consumption-to-output ratio 0.151 0.151
wnh̄∕y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571
rk / y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429
h̄ Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333
r̄ After-tax net return on capital 0.014 0.016
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equations around the steady-state. This transformation produces a first-order system 
of stochastic difference equations. First, we study the dynamic behavior of model 
variables to an isolated shock to the total factor productivity process, and then we 
fully simulate the model to compare how the second moments of the model perform 
when compared against their empirical counterparts.
5.1  Impulse response analysis
This subsection documents the impulse responses of model variables to a 1% sur-
prise innovation to technology. The impulse response functions (IRFs) are presented 
in Figs. 2 and 3 and on the next page. For expositional purposes, the two models 
(RW and MU) are presented separately. As a result of the one-time unexpected posi-
tive shock to total factor productivity, output increases upon impact. This expands 
the availability of resources in the economy, so used of output—consumption, 
investment, and government consumption also increase contemporaneously.
At the same time, the increase in productivity increases the after-tax return on 
the two factors of production, labor and capital. The representative households then 
Fig. 2  Impulse responses to a 1% surprise innovation in technology, RW model
155
1 3
Eurasian Economic Review (2020) 10:143–161 
respond to the incentives contained in prices and start accumulating capital, and 
supplies more hours worked. In turn, the increase in capital input feeds back in out-
put through the production function and that further adds to the positive effect of the 
technology shock. In the labor market, the wage rate increases, and the household 
increases its hours worked. In turn, the increase in total hours further increases out-
put, again indirectly.
Over time, as capital is being accumulated, its after-tax marginal product starts 
to decrease, which lowers the households’ incentives to save. As a result, physi-
cal capital stock eventually returns to its steady-state, and exhibits a hump-shaped 
dynamics over its transition path. The rest of the model variables return to their old 
steady-states in a monotone fashion as the effect of the one-time surprise innovation 
in technology dies out.
In the case of the union model, the effect of the technology shock is short-lived 
due to the fact that the union does not internalize the capital externality. In other 
words, the sequential bargaining between the union and the firm now is a major 
Fig. 3  Impulse responses to a 1% surprise innovation in technology, MU model
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internal mechanism, which quantitatively dominates the work of the capital accumu-
lation. Note that with unions there is no intra-temporal optimality between consump-
tion and labor, as the household no longer individually determines its labor supply. 
The two models also produce different dynamics for the wage rate, in the RW econ-
omy, it follows a hump shape, while in the union model, it converges monotonically.
5.2  Simulation and moment‑matching
As in Vasilev (2017b), we will now simulate the model 10,000 times for the length 
of the data horizon. Both empirical and model simulated data is detrended using the 
Hodrick and Prescott (1980) filter. Table 3 on the next page summarizes the second 
moments of data (relative volatilities to output, and contemporaneous correlations 
with output) versus the same moments computed from the model-simulated data at 
quarterly frequency. To minimize the sample error, the simulated moments are aver-
aged out over the computer-generated draws. As in Vasilev (2016, 2017b, c), both 
models match quite well the absolute volatility of output; by construction, govern-
ment consumption in the model varies as much as output. In addition, the predicted 
consumption volatilities are a bit too high, where the increase in consumption vari-
ability in the union could be attributed to the collective bargaining mechanism. Still, 
the model is qualitatively consistent with the stylized fact that consumption gener-
ally varies less than output, while investment is more volatile than output. Again, the 
union model is closer to data in terms of the magnitude of the empirical investment 
volatility. With a monopoly union in the model, the quantitative importance of capi-
tal accumulation is now lower, and as a result, investment variability is depressed.
With respect to the labor market variables, the variability of employment pre-
dicted by the model is lower than that in data in the RW setup, and higher in the 
MU model. On the other hand, the variability of wages in the model is very close 
to that in data for the RW economy, and a bit too low in the MU model. This is 
yet another confirmation that the perfectly-competitive assumption, that wages equal 
Table 3  Business cycle 
moments Data Model RW MU model
휎y 0.05 0.05 0.05
휎c∕휎y 0.55 0.76 0.95
휎i∕휎y 1.77 2.34 1.56
휎g∕휎y 1.21 1.00 1.00
휎n∕휎y 0.63 0.17 0.95
휎w∕휎y 0.83 0.88 0.33
휎y∕h∕휎y 0.86 0.88 0.33
corr(c, y) 0.85 0.92 0.95
corr(i, y) 0.61 0.89 0.79
corr(g, y) 0.31 1.00 1.00
corr(n, y) 0.49 0.72 0.91
corr(w, y) − 0.01 0.99 0.31
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their marginal product, used also in Vasilev (2009), as well as the benchmark cali-
bration of the RW model with indivisible labor here, does not describe very well the 
dynamics of labor market variables, even when we allow for the presence of unions.
Next, in terms of contemporaneous correlations, both models systematically over-
predicts the pro-cyclicality of the main aggregate variables—consumption, invest-
ment, government consumption, and employment. This, however, is a common limi-
tation of this class of RBC models. With respect to wages, the RW setup predicts a 
strong pro-cyclicality, while wages in data are a-cyclical. This shortcoming is well-
known in the literature and an artefact of the wage being equal to the labor produc-
tivity in the model. In contrast, the monopoly union model provides a better descrip-
tion of the labor market dynamics in Bulgaria, as it only predicts a moderate wage 
pro-cyclicality. In addition, the correlation of wages and output drops to zero if the 
reservation wage does not respond to productivity shocks.9 This is a success for the 
MU model, since, after all, not all of the Bulgarian economy is unionized, and most 
of the collective bargaining procedures takes place at a firm’s level.
In the next subsection, as in Vasilev (2015c), we investigate the dynamic cor-
relation between labor market variables at different leads and lags, thus evaluating 
how well the model matches the phase dynamics among variables. In addition, the 
autocorrelation functions (ACFs) of empirical data, obtained from an unrestricted 
VAR(1) are put under scrutiny and compared and contrasted to the simulated coun-
terparts generated from the two competing models.
5.3  Auto‑ and cross‑correlation
This subsection discusses the auto-(ACFs) and cross-correlation functions (CCFs) 
of the major model variables. The coefficients empirical ACFs and CCFs at different 
leads and lags are presented in Tables 4 and 5 below against the averaged simulated 
AFCs and CCFs. Following Canova (2007), this exercise is used as a goodness-of-fit 
measure.
Both models compare relatively well vis-a-vis data. Empirical ACFs for output 
and investment are slightly outside the confidence band predicted by the model, 
while the ACFs for total factor productivity and household consumption are well-
approximated by the model. The persistence of labor market variables is also rel-
atively well-described by the model dynamics. Overall, both models generate too 
much persistence in output and both employment and unemployment, and is subject 
to the criticism in Nelson and Plosser (1982), Cogley and Nason (1995), Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1996), and Hall (1999), who argue that the RBC class of models do 
not have a strong internal propagation mechanism besides the strong persistence in 
the TFP process. In those models, e.g. the RW setup, labor market is modeled in the 
Walrasian market-clearing spirit, and output and unemployment persistence is low. 
Indeed, when unions are allowed in the model, the MU setup is marginally better 
than the RW in terms of autocorrelations.
9 Maffezzoli (2001) does not report the volatility of wages in his calibration for Italy, but from the 
impulse responses it can be seen that his model suffers from very low wage variability as well.
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A similar picture can be observed in the cross-correlations: as seen from Table 6 
below, over the business cycle, in data labor productivity leads employment. The 
RW model, however, cannot account for this fact. As in the standard RBC model, a 
technology shock can be regarded as a factor shifting the labor demand curve, while 
holding the labor supply curve constant. Therefore, the effect between employment 
and labor productivity is only a contemporaneous one.
In contrast, the model with a monopoly union, where the wage is determined via 
a sequential bargaining procedure between the firm and the union, is able to match 
the low contemporaneous correlation between hours and wages, as well as the gen-
eral dynamic pattern at various leads and lags (see Table 7). This is yet another indi-
cation that the presence of unions and collective agreements is important for the 
observed dynamics in the labor market in Bulgaria for the period after the introduc-
tion of the currency board.
6  Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the quantitative importance of collective bargain-
ing agreements for the observed fluctuations in Bulgarian labor markets. Follow-
ing Maffezzoli (2001), we introduce a monopoly union into a real-business-cycle 
Table 4  Autocorrelations for 
Bulgarian data and the RW 
model economy
Methods Statistic k
0 1 2 3
Data corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.765 0.552 0.553
Model RW corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.954 0.897 0.831
(SE) (0.000) (0.028) (0.054) (0.071)
Data corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.484 0.009 0.352
Model RW corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.954 0.897 0.831
(SE) (0.000) (0.028) (0.054) (0.071)
Data corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.810 0.663 0.479
Model RW corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.957 0.906 0.848
(SE) (0.000) (0.026) (0.050) (0.072)
Data corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.702 0.449 0.277
Model RW corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.954 0.900 0.837
(SE) (0.000) (0.028) (0.053) (0.077)
Data corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.971 0.952 0.913
Model RW corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.958 0.909 0.855
(SE) (0.000) (0.024) (0.047) (0.069)
Data corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.810 0.722 0.594
Model RW corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.955 0.900 0.836
(SE) (0.000) (0.028) (0.053) (0.077)
Data corr(wt,wt−k) 1.000 0.760 0.783 0.554
Model RW corr(wt,wt−k) 1.000 0.957 0.907 0.851
(SE) (0.000) (0.025) (0.049) (0.071)
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model with government sector. We calibrate the model to Bulgarian data for the 
period following the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999–2018), 
and compare and contrast it to a model without unions. We find that the sequential 
bargaining procedure between the monopoly union and the stand-in firm produces 
an important internal propagation mechanism within the theoretical setup, which 
Table 5  Autocorrelations for 
Bulgarian data and the MU 
model economy
Method Statistic k
0 1 2 3
Data corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.765 0.552 0.553
Model MU corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.954 0.905 0.852
(SE) (0.000) (0.021) (0.041) (0.060)
Data corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.484 0.009 0.352
Model MU corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.954 0.905 0.852
(SE) (0.000) (0.021) (0.041) (0.060)
Data corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.810 0.663 0.479
Model MU corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.954 0.903 0.849
(SE) (0.000) (0.023) (0.045) (0.065)
Data corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.702 0.449 0.277
Model MU corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.955 0.901 0.838
(SE) (0.000) (0.027) (0.053) (0.077)
Data corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.971 0.952 0.913
Model MU corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.954 0.905 0.851
(SE) (0.000) (0.021) (0.042) (0.061)
Data corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.810 0.722 0.594
Model MU corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.954 0.901 0.841
(SE) (0.000) (0.026) (0.051) (0.074)
Data corr(wt,wt−k) 1.000 0.760 0.783 0.554
Model MU corr(wt,wt−k) 1.000 0.955 0.901 0.838
(SE) (0.000) (0.027) (0.053) (0.077)
Table 6  Dynamic correlations for Bulgarian data and the RW model economy
Method Statistic k
− 3 − 2 −1 0 1 2 3
Data corr(nt, (y∕n)t−k) − 0.342 − 0.363 − 0.187 − 0.144 0.475 0.470 0.346
RW corr(nt, (y∕n)t−k) 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.621 0.065 0.029 0.004
(SE) (0.336) (0.292) (0.239) (0.224) (0.215) (0.259) (0.030)
Data corr(nt,wt−k) 0.355 0.452 0.447 0.328 − 0.040 − 0.390 − 0.57
RW corr(nt,wt−k) 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.621 0.065 0.029 0.004
(SE) (0.336) (0.292) (0.239) (0.224) (0.215) (0.259) (0.030)
160 Eurasian Economic Review (2020) 10:143–161
1 3
allows the monopoly model to fit data much better than the alternative framework 
with perfectly-competitive labor markets.
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